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Abstract 
There is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean 
prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean 
exports from Third-World countries. This issue is evaluated by analysing how retail 
prices, preferences and market power influence coffee demand in Sweden. A demand 
function is estimated for the period 1968-2002 and used, together with information on 
import prices of coffee beans, to simulate an oligopoly model. This approach gives 
estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee 
demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level. The 
maximum level of market power is found to be low, but it generates large spreads 
between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute 
values. Moreover, the impact of a price decrease would be small because long-run 
coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination 
with different preferences across age groups. Hence, a change to perfect competition 
would only have a negligible effect on bean imports.  
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1. Introduction 
It is a common opinion that oligopolistic market structures constitute a key problem 
for commodity-exporting, less-developed countries (Gibbon, 2005). This view gained 
ground after the collapse of coffee-bean prices in the late 1990s, when they returned 
to the 1960s level in nominal terms. Since a few multinational companies are active in 
most coffee markets, both as buyers of green coffee and suppliers of processed coffee, 
they are held responsible, directly or indirectly, for keeping bean prices down while 
maintaining high consumer prices.1 As a consequence, Third-World bean exports and 
bean prices are kept below the level that would prevail in a competitive market. 
 
The issue of market power in commodity markets is analysed in some detail by 
Morisset (1997, 1998). He looks at coffee markets, as well as several other markets, 
and finds symptoms of market power in all of them. For instance, in a sample of six 
industrialised countries, the average spread between consumer coffee prices and world 
bean prices increased on average by 186% from 1975 to 1994. This is attributed to 
asymmetric transmissions of world price changes to consumer prices. To evaluate the 
consequences of the increase in price spreads for developing countries’ export 
revenue, Morisset (1997) simulates the impact of a reduction in consumer prices to 
the minimum spread observed during the 1970-1994 period. It would have increased 
export earnings to the order of at least 20-60% annually from 1991 to 1994.  
 
Talbot (1997) also addresses the issue of market power in coffee markets.  He uses a 
different approach, global value chain analysis. He finds that the collapse of the 
International Coffee Agreement at the end of the 1980s led to an increase in market 
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power and a massive shift of surplus from coffee producing countries to 
multinationals. According to Talbot, multinational companies exercise market power 
as buyers of green coffee by holding down prices and as sellers of processed coffee by 
inflating consumer prices. Global value chain analyses by Fitter and Kaplinsky (2001) 
and Daviron and Ponte (2005, Chap. 6) obtain similar results.  
  
Although multinational companies may have market power as buyers of green coffee, 
as Ponte (2002) argues, the large price spreads seem to occur between import prices 
and prices of processed coffee, not between farm gate and world market prices (see 
Daviron and Ponte, 2005, Chap. 6). Moreover, Krivonos (2004) shows that the 
transmission of price signals from world market prices to coffee growers works quite 
well after the implementation of coffee sector reforms in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Although these results do not preclude the existence of oligopsony power, they 
indicate we should search for market power in consumer markets.  
 
There are probably less than ten studies that directly attempt to test for market power 
in national consumer markets (see Gibbon, 2005). Most of these find that the degree 
of market power is small, although there is some evidence of oligopoly power, e.g. 
Bhuyan and Lopez (1997). There is, thus, conflicting evidence, and the question of 
why the difference between bean and consumer prices is perceived to be high is not 
answered.  
 
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the presence of market power in the 
Swedish market for roasted and ground coffee, and evaluate potential losses for coffee 
growers. The Swedish market for roasted and ground coffee has a market structure 
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that is typical for many European markets: in 2002, the four largest companies had a 
market share of 87% and two multinationals (Kraft Foods and Nestlé) had 57%.2 
Moreover, roasted and ground coffee is relatively expensive in Sweden.  It was 7% 
above the EU average in 2002 (European Commission, 2002a).  
 
The analysis is carried out by first estimating demand for roasted and ground coffee 
during the time period 1968-2002. Then, the price elasticity estimates and import 
costs of green coffee beans are entered into a simple model of oligopolistic interaction 
to obtain values of the maximum average degree of market power. The cost of green 
coffee beans is used as the minimum value of marginal cost.  This is because it is by 
far the most important input and there is a fixed relationship between roasted and 
green beans.3  Furthermore, there exists good data on import prices, which is not the 
case for other marginal cost components. In the final step, information concerning 
how the export of coffee beans to Sweden responds to price change is obtained by 
simulating a shift to perfect competition. In this model, perfect competition implies 
that consumer prices become equal to the price of imported beans.  
 
The analysis only gives rough estimates of average levels of market power and their 
impact on consumption and imports, and it would have been preferable to use detailed 
firm-level data that allow modelling dynamic firm interaction, but these are not 
available. Nonetheless, the approach is robust and transparent, compared to estimating 
a structural oligopoly model for a market over a 35-year period when there is a 
paucity of data on costs.4    
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Our main findings are that in the long run coffee consumption per adult is dominated 
by population dynamics in combination with differences in preferences across 
generations, and the absolute values of the price elasticity are small (on average 0.19). 
As a result, sharp reductions in price only generate small increases in demand and, 
consequently, in the import of coffee beans. Moreover, the measure of market power, 
the maximum elasticity adjusted Lerner index, was found to only be about 0.10 for the 
period 1985-2002.  This result is less than half of what Cournot competition predicts 
and very far from unity, which would indicate prefect collusion. However, because of 
low price elasticity, the low degree of market power generates a substantial spread 
between consumer and bean prices. Another finding is that the average value of the 
elasticity adjusted Lerner index is higher during the period 1985-2002 than before.  
As Talbot (1997) claims, this could be due to increased market power following the 
breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement. In absolute terms, the increase in 
market power is small, from about 0.05 in the early 1970s to 0.1.  Without checking 
for other components of marginal cost, we cannot say what caused the change. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives a brief description of the 
Swedish coffee market, while Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework. Section 4 
presents the econometric approach to model coffee demand, and Section 5 describes 
the data. Section 6 reports the results from the econometric analysis, and Section 7 
interprets the findings using the oligopoly model. Finally, section 8 summarises and 
draws some conclusions. 
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2. The Swedish Coffee market 
Although the Swedish coffee market is small compared to the world market, about 
1.5% in 2003, per capita consumption has been among the top five in the world for 
several decades. Roasted and ground coffee accounts for about 90% of all coffee 
consumed, while instant coffee has had a market share of about 10% since the 1980s 
(and somewhat less during the 1970s). The sale of beans to consumers is negligible. 
Quality is relatively high and uniform: the Arabica bean, mainly used in high-quality 
coffee, makes up close to 100% of bean imports, while Robusta, used in low-quality 
coffee, espresso and instant coffee, is not utilized in coffee roasted for Swedish 
retailers.  
 
Roasters located in Sweden produce most of the roasted coffee consumed. Imports of 
roasted coffee were about 2% or less of total consumption until 1993, when it rose 
sharply because the roasting of one brand (Luxus) moved to Finland: in 2002, imports 
accounted for 9% of consumption. All instant coffee is imported (Swedish National 
Coffee Association, 2005b). 
 
As in many other countries, there has been a trend towards increased market 
concentration and the presence of multinationals in coffee roasting. There is no 
available data on market shares before the 1980s, but there were about 20 roasters in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, all locally owned. During the first half of the 1970s, rapid 
re-structuring took place. Several roasters closed down or merged with others, and 
General Foods (later sold to Kraft) bought Gevalia, the largest Swedish brand. Since 
then, the market has been relatively stable. In 1978, there were twelve roasters, and by 
2002 ten remained (Statistics Sweden, various issues). The most important events 
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since 1978 are Nestlé’s acquisition of Zoégas Kaffe AB in 1986, Kraft Foods’ 1994 
purchase of Cirkel AB, and the subsequent removal of the brand Cirkelkaffe from the 
market.  
 
 
In 1982, there were five large roasters that together had 84% of the market. Their 
market share rose to 90% by 1992, but because of Kraft’s purchase of Cirkel AB the 
number of big players was reduced to four. In 2002, their share was 87%, and the two 
multinationals (Kraft and Nestlé) together had 57% of the market.  
 
As concentration in roasting increased, retailers’ own brands also grew in importance, 
particularly during the 1990s. In 2002, the two largest retail chains together had a 
market share of about 6% of retail sales of roasted coffee (Swedish National Coffee 
Association, 2005a). Their coffee is roasted in Finland and Denmark. 
 
In many countries, the caffe-latte “revolution” is taking place, where consumers are 
switching to higher-quality beans and espresso coffee (with milk). This is occurring in 
Sweden as well, though only very recently; consumption of espresso was only about 
0.1% in 1997, and 0.8% in 2002 of total consumption (Swedish National Coffee 
Association, 2005a). Hence, although there is rapid growth in this niche, which most 
likely will lead to changes in the coffee market, it hardly matters for this study. 
 
The retail food sector is not considered explicitly in analysis, and arms’ length pricing 
is assumed. Yet, there is a common opinion that retailers have market power in many 
European countries and that it has increased recently (Hughes, 2002). In Swedish food 
retailing, market concentration is high; the four-firm concentration ratio was about 
75% in 2004. However, it decreased during the 1990s due to the entrance of new 
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actors, and there is no evidence of increasing market power (Swedish Competition 
Authority, 2004). In spite of the high concentration ratio, the assumption of a passive 
retailing sector seems reasonable for coffee in Sweden, since roasters can alter their 
prices whenever they wish.5  Moreover, as in several other European markets, retailer 
margins for standard coffee are low since it is used as a loss leader (Tea and Coffee 
Trade Journal, 1992; Daviron and Ponte, 2005, p. 93).  
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
 
In this section, we describe the oligopoly model, and how the results from the demand 
analysis are used to evaluate the degree of market power. The model is static and 
relies on conjectural variations; that is, a firm’s belief (conjecture) about its 
competitors’ response determines its own maximizing choice of output or price. 
Conjectural variation models have been used widely in both theoretical and empirical 
analyses.  However, they have also been criticized on the grounds that multi-period 
interpretations are implausible (Lindh, 1992; Carlton and Perloff, 2005). Nonetheless, 
recent research has demonstrated that conjectural variation can be interpreted as the 
steady state of a dynamic game under bounded rationality (Friedman and Mezzetti, 
2002; Dixon and Somma, 2003). Here, the model is used to obtain a measure of the 
maximum elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, i.e., the price cost margin normalized by 
both the price level and the demand elasticity. This measure distinguishes between 
markets that have high margins because of inelastic demand and those that have high 
margins because of the presence of more market power (Corts, 1999; Wolfram, 1999).  
 
The formulation of the model is based on Bettendorf and Verboven (2002), who apply 
it to the Dutch coffee market.6 There is one homogenous good, and the supply 
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relationship is derived by assuming that firm i (i= 1…n) maximizes its profit, iπ , 
which is given by,  
 
1 ( ) ( , )
1 ii i i
P Q Q C Q wπ τ= −+  (1) 
whereτ  is value added tax, Q the total industry output, Qi output of firm i, P(Q) the 
inverse demand function, Ci(Qi, w) the cost function and w a vector of input prices 
assumed to equal for all firms.  
 
The first-order order condition to firm i’s profit-maximizing problem is  
 1 [ ( ) ]
1 i
i
i
CP P Q Q
Q
θτ
∂′+ =+ ∂  (2) 
where is the derivative of P(Q) with respect to Q , P is the price of coffee, and '( )P Q
( /i Q Q .)( / )i iQ Qθ = ∂ ∂  The parameter iθ is the conjectural variation elasticity, and it 
characterizes the firm’s behaviour. It can take any value between zero and one in the 
conjectural variation approach. However, when interpreted in the light of one-shot 
games, 0iθ =  implies that the firm sets prices equal to marginal cost (Bertrand 
competition), 1iθ =
i
 represents joint-profit maximization, i.e., a perfect cartel, and 
θ equal to the i’th firm’s market share ( iQ Q ) means there is Cournot competition 
where firms set quantities (see Porter, 1983).  
 
Since we use market data, the model has to be aggregated all the firms. Following 
Appelbaum (1982) and Bettendorf and Verboven (2000), two assumptions are made: 
the cost functions are of Gorman polar form and firms face the same input prices. This 
implies that the cost curves and size of the firms can vary, but marginal costs, MC (w), 
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are constant and equal across firms. The market supply relation is then obtained by 
multiplying Equation (2) by Qi/Q and aggregating over all firms, 
 1 [ ( ) ] (
1
P P Q Q MC wθτ ′+ =+ )  (3) 
where ( )( ) ( / )i i i iMC w C Q Q Q= ∂ ∂∑  and ( / )Q Qi i i .θ θ∑=  By re-writing 
Equation (3), we get an equation that describes the supply relation: 
 (1 ) ( ) - '( ) .P MC w P Q Qτ θ= +  (4) 
According to Equation (4), the price of a good depends on three factors: marginal 
cost, including VAT, market power, and demand. The measure of market power, θ , is 
the market-share weighted average of iθ of all n firms. As for iθ  a value of zero shows 
that price is equal to marginal cost, and a value of unity indicates a perfect cartel. 
However, when there is Cournot competition, θ  is equal to the Herfindahl index.7  
 
By multiplying and dividing Equation (4) by P, we introduce the demand elasticity,  
 (1 ) ( )P MC w Pθτ η= + +  (5) 
 
where ( ) (Q P P Q).η = − ∂ ∂  This shows that θ cannot be larger than the absolute 
value of the price elasticity, since that would imply negative marginal costs. Hence, 
simply by estimating the demand function, we get some information about the size of 
θ . Moreover, rewriting Equation (5) in terms of ;θ   
 (1 ) ( )P MC w
P
τθ η− +=  (6) 
it becomes clear that θ  is price-cost gap divided by P, the Lerner index, adjusted by 
the absolute value of the demand elasticity. 
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Estimating Equation (4) requires both estimates of demand to obtain '( ),P Q and of 
marginal cost. However, since information on marginal cost is difficult to obtain for 
the study period, the dominant role of green coffee beans in coffee roasting is 
exploited.  By assuming that marginal cost is equal to the import cost of beans, i.e., a 
measure of the minimum marginal cost, maximum levels of market power and the 
Lerner index can be calculated by entering estimated price elasticity into, for example, 
Equation 6. Such estimates provide maximum benchmarks since a higher marginal 
cost would reduce the measure of market power and the Learner index.  
 
The argument for using the cost of beans as the measure of marginal cost is based on 
the fixed relationship between green beans and roasted coffee; to make 1 kg of roasted 
coffee, approximately 1.19 kg beans is required (Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000). 
Moreover, since coffee quality primarily is driven by bean type, which is reflected in 
the import price, this captures variations in quality. Other inputs usually each make up 
less than 5% of total variable costs, and rarely more than 10% (Koerner, 2002).  In 
Sweden, only wages and packaging ever exceeded 5% of variable costs during the 
study period (Statistics Sweden, various issues). Moreover, there are few economies 
of scale in coffee roasting and grinding, so marginal costs are largely independent of 
output, and companies have similar marginal cost functions in spite of varying size 
(Sutton, 1991).  
4. Modelling Coffee Demand     
Equation (7) shows a static linear demand function designed to represent long-run 
equilibrium demand for coffee in Sweden: 
 0 1 2 3 ,Q P Y Gβ β β β= + + +  (7) 
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where Q is the quantity of roasted coffee per adult, P is the relative price of coffee, Y 
is income, G is a variable capturing changes in population and  β0, β1, β2 and β3 are 
parameters.8 The relative price of coffee is defined as the nominal price divided by 
the consumer price index. Relative prices for more specific coffee substitutes, e.g. te
could also be used, but tea prices do not work as well empirically. Moreover, it is 
unlikely that tea prices influence coffee demand in Sweden, where coffee 
consumption dominates heavily.
a, 
9 Within the price range observed in our sample, it 
seems more probable that coffee-price increases primarily lead to better utilization of 
already purchased coffee. As reported by Bettendorf and Verboven (1998), market 
studies have shown that as much as 25% of purchased coffee is not actually drunk.  
 
Real income is the second variable in the demand function. Usually an increase in 
income is expected to increase consumption. Nevertheless, this might not be the case 
in a market that is mature and where practically all consumers can afford to buy the 
product.  In fact, as shown below, only the change in income affects coffee 
consumption in Sweden. 
 
Finally, we have G, which captures population dynamics. Intuitively, a growing 
population generates higher demand, given prices.  However, consumption patterns 
can differ significantly across age groups. According to the Swedish coffee industry, 
there has been a slowdown in coffee consumption due to a change in preferences; 
people born around 1960 and later do not drink as much coffee as those born before 
the 1960s, who quite often consume about six cups per day.10 This process seems to 
have started at the end of the 1970s, and continues as the number of those born before 
1960 declines. This change in preferences is measured by defining the variable G as 
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the share of the population at the age of 18 and older born before 1960 in the total 
population at 18 and older. 
 
An important aspect of Equation (7) is that it describes the static state of a dynamic 
process. Hence, like most economic time series, they are likely to contain stochastic 
and/or deterministic trends. The model we end up estimating is a restricted version of 
the following autoregressive distributed lag model:  
 0 1 2 3 4
1 0 0
k k k
t i t i i t i i t i
i i i
Q Q P Y t tGπ π π π π− − −
= = =
= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ε  (8) 
where π0 contains the constant and a dummy variable capturing the effects of frost in 
Brazil in 1977, the variable G is treated as a deterministic variable because it changes 
very slowly over time, and εt is a mean zero white noise process. The long-run 
solution of Equation (8) gives the static state shown by Equation (7). 
 
Since some or all of the variables in Equation (8) might be non-stationary, Johansen’s 
(1988, 1995) procedure is first used to test whether some individual variables are 
stationary and whether some of them are cointegrated.11 This is done by estimating a 
vector autoregressive model, VAR, in error correction form. The long-run responses 
of the system are collected in an n n×  matrix defined as Π. The hypothesis of 
cointegration is about the rank of Π:. It is tested with the trace test, a likelihood ratio 
procedure, and it amounts to finding the number of linearly independent columns in 
Π.. When Π  is of reduced rank, we can write 'αβΠ = , which has ( 1r n )≤ −  
cointegrating vectors, where r = rank. By testing for the significance of the 
components in ',β  the coefficients of the cointegrating vector, we can then evaluate 
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what variables enter the cointegrating vector.  Further, by testing the components of 
α, the adjustment coefficients, we can determine whether there is feedback between Q 
and P, that is, whether P is weakly exogenous. If it is weakly exogenous, we only 
need to estimate a single-equation model. 
5. A Look at the Data 
In this section, the data is described using plots. The purpose is to provide intuition to 
the empirical results. The data are yearly, and the period analyzed is 1968–2002.12 
  
The two core variables usually assumed to explain demand are price and income. In 
Figure 1, consumption of roasted and ground coffee, measured in kilos per person aged 
18 or older, is depicted together with per capita income, measured by total consumer 
expenditure. Note that the mean and variance of the income variable have been adjusted 
to highlight the relationship between the two variables. Coffee consumption was stable 
until the 1975, when it declined due to a sharp, but temporary, increase in prices. From 
the end of the 1970s, there was a downward trend in consumption until 2002. Income 
per capita, on the other hand, grew almost continuously between 1968 and 2002. It is, 
thus, obvious that income did not determine coffee consumption during the period of 
analysis. The reason is probably that the level of income was so high already in the 
1960s that the vast majority of the population could afford to buy all the coffee it 
needed. Hence, there must be other factors driving coffee consumption in the long run.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 13
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of coffee consumption per adult and the mean and 
variance adjusted relative price of coffee (the retail price of roasted coffee divided by 
the consumer price index, set to unity in 1995). Although the negative relationship is 
visible during the end of the 1970s and around 1995, the two variables generally move 
in the same direction. It is thus apparent that price and income cannot explain coffee 
consumption by themselves.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Since the slowdown in coffee consumption has been attributed to differences in 
preferences between those born around the 1960s and later and older generations, 
Figure 3 shows the proxy for changes in preferences, G, and per-capita consumption. 
The preference effect started at the end of the 1970s and continued as the share of 
those born before 1960 declined. Hence, its evolution coincides with coffee 
consumption.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Finally, we graphed the price series and consumption net of the preference effect, that 
is, a series obtained by regressing Q on G. As shown by Figure 4, there is a strong 
negative relationship between the two series. Hence, the change in preferences seems 
to capture the long run evolution of coffee consumption well, while the relative price 
variable explains the movements around the trend. 
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Figure 4 about here 
 
6. Empirical Analysis 
The data analysis is performed in two steps. First, we use the Johansen approach to 
test for integration and cointegration.  Then, we estimate a general single-equation 
autoregressive model, which is tested to make sure that the assumptions regarding its 
stochastic properties are fulfilled. After that, the single-equation autoregressive model 
is reduced in order to obtain a parsimonious model. Finally, the stability of the model 
is investigated using recursive estimation. 
 
The cointegration analysis is carried out for the period 1968-2002 with Q and P as 
endogenous variables and G as a deterministic variable. Income enters as a weakly 
exogenous variable in first differences (ΔY) since, as evident from Figure 1, the level 
of consumption does not affect coffee consumption. We also include an impulse 
dummy for the sharp increase in coffee-bean prices in 1977.13 Estimating the model 
with two lags over the period 1969-2002 and then testing for misspecification 
determined the number of lags. None of the tests for autocorrelation, non-normality, 
and heteroscedasticity were significant at the 5% level. A likelihood ratio test for 
reducing the model to one lag was then implemented. It was not significant so one lag 
of Q and P seems to capture the dynamics adequately. The first lag of ΔY was 
insignificant so it too was removed. The test statistics for the likelihood ratio test and 
the diagnostic tests are reported in Table 1. 
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Table 2 reports the main results from the application of the maximum likelihood 
procedure. The first line lists the estimated eigenvalues of the Π−matrix. The smallest 
one is 0.35, so both of them are all clearly larger than zero, indicating the rank is two. 
The trace test for the rank of the Π−matrix and critical values are reported on the 
following lines. The critical values are based on the asymptotic distributions for 
restricted trend and unrestricted constant since G behaves as a deterministic variable, 
Moreover, since the trace test has low power in small samples, the 90% critical values 
were used.. The null hypotheses of a rank of zero and one are clearly rejected.  
 
Information about the rank of the Π-matrix is also provided by the adjustment 
coefficients. In both columns of the α−matrix, reported in the lower panel of Table 2, 
there are entries with high t-values. This constitutes support for the presence of two 
stationary relationships in the data. Since visual inspection of graphs of the 
cointegrating vectors14 also indicates that there are two stationary relationships, we 
proceed under the assumption that the rank of the Π-matrix is two.  
  
The importance of including G for the stability of the system, and the finding of two 
cointegrating vectors, is indicated on the last two rows in the upper panel of Table 2. 
The largest root of the companion matrix process is 0.60 when G is included in the 
VAR, while the largest root without G is 1.02. 
 
To identify the stationary vectors, the significance of each individual variable was 
first tested; all three test statistics were highly significant, as shown by the last line in 
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Table 2. Then we tested if Q and G form one stationary relationship, while P is 
stationary by itself. The test was not significant at the 10% level.  
 
Table 3 reports the test statistics for the restricted cointegrating vectors, the 
standardized eigenvectors, β, and the adjustment coefficients α. The first long run 
relation is Q = 13.5G while the other one is made up of P only. Since α11 is negative 
and highly significant, coffee consumption adjusts to changes in G, as expected. 
Furthermore, α12 is also negative and significant, showing that the price level affects 
coffee consumption. However, there is no feedback from coffee consumption on 
prices since α21 is insignificant. This implies that we can treat prices as weakly 
exogenous and model coffee demand using single-equation analysis. 
 
In the second step, we estimate a single-equation model. To ensure that all variables 
are stationary, Q is replaced by Q* = Q - 13.5G. Moreover, an impulse dummy for 
1976 is added to capture the rise in consumption preceding the price increase.15 By 
including two impulse dummies (Dum76 and Dum77), we allow the effects of the 
price shock to cancel out. First a general model is estimated and the variables with 
insignificant coefficients are removed, e.g. lagged Q* (not reported). The model 
obtained is thus:   
 
  (9) 
*
-1
2
(0.24)   (0.005)       (0.004)         (0.029)           (0.36)               (0.48)
   2.5 -  0.017  -  0.013   0.074   0.98 76 -  1.5 77
          
ˆ0.866  0.331 1968 - 2002 (2,27) 0.
t t t t
ar
Q P P Y Dum
R T Fσ
= + Δ +
= = = =
2
*
59 [0.56]
 (1,27) 0.468 [0.50] (8,20) 0.26 [0.97] (2) 3.99 [0.14] 
(1,28) 0.15 [0.70] -13.5
arch het norm
reset t t t
F F
F Q Q G
χ= = =
= =
Dum
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 where coefficient standard errors are shown in parentheses, σˆ is the residual standard 
deviation, and T is the sample period. The diagnostic tests are for serial correlation of 
order 2, Far, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity of order 1, Farch, 
heteroscedasticity, Fhet, nonlinearity, the RESET test, Freset, and a chi-square test for 
normality, (see Hendry and Doornik (2001) for details). 2 (2)Normχ
 
In Equation (9), both contemporaneous and lagged prices enter with negative, and 
clearly significant, coefficients, income growth has a positive coefficient, and the 
dummy variables have opposite signs. Hence, the model appears to make economic 
sense. Since all the diagnostic tests are insignificant, the model is statistically well-
specified. 
 
By estimating the model recursively, its empirical constancy was assessed.16 The 
output from this exercise is summarized in graphs for the period 1980-2002. The four 
graphs in the upper panel of Figure 5 depict the recursively estimated coefficients and 
their ±2 standard errors. Considering the small number of observations and the long 
time period, they are quite stable, particularly between 1985 and 2002. The one-step 
residuals and their ±2 standard errors are depicted in the fifth graph; since all the 
estimates are within the standard error region there is no indication of outliers. The 
last three graphs report test statistics from three Chow tests, one-step, break-point and 
forecast Chow tests. They are graphed such that the straight line matches the 1% 
significance level. Only one Chow test statistic is significant, and it is only significant 
at the 1% level, while all the others are insignificant.  
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 To relate Equation (9) to our theoretical model Equation (7), the static solution of (9) 
was calculated, yielding  
 
 (0.38)   (0.004)        (0.03)          (0.48)         (0.67)
   
   2.6 -  0.029   0.072  13.28  0.53
         
                 
tQ P Y G Dum= + Δ + −
 (10) 
where coefficient standard errors are shown in parentheses. Equation (10) shows that 
the price variable is negative and highly significant; its t-value is -7.9. A decline in 
coffee prices by one Swedish krona per kilo increases demand by 29 gram per adult, 
controlling for all the other variables. In 2002, this would correspond to a total 
increase of 2.3 tonnes, which should be compared to an actual consumption of 66,000 
tonnes; the impact of a change in price is thus very small. Equation (10) also shows 
that the sum of the two dummy variables is not statistically different from zero, 
indicating that the price shock in 1977 did not have a lasting effect on coffee demand. 
Moreover, the generation variable, G, has the same coefficient as in the cointegration 
test, and growth in per capita income is significant, but the t-value is only 2.4. 
 
7. Market Power and Coffee Exports: Interpreting the Results  
Figure 6 reports the absolute values of the price elasticity based on Equation (10). It 
shows how the elasticity has varied over time, and that the highest value is 0.38. The 
average over the study period is 0.19, and the standard deviation is 0.06. Evidently, 
competition in the coffee market keeps the elasticity well below 1, which is the 
minimum we would expect with perfect collusion among the roasters. The finding of 
low price elasticity is consistent with studies on coffee demand in other countries, 
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such as Bettendorf and Verboven, (2000) for the Netherlands, Feuerstein (2002) for 
West Germany, and Koerner (2002) and Olekalns and Bardsley (1996) for the US.  
 
Another useful piece of information is obtained by using the fact that θ  is equal to the 
Herfindahl index in Cournot competition with firms of different sizes.17 Dividing the 
measures of the Herfindahl index by the absolute value of the price elasticity indicates 
whether Cournot competition is a possibility, since the ratio cannot be larger than one; 
it would imply negative marginal costs, as evident from Equation (5). Data on market 
shares, available for certain years from the early 1980s and onwards, indicate that the 
Herfindahl index was 0.18 in 1982, rose during the following years, and reached 0.27 
in 1997, where it remained until 2002.  Meanwhile, the average price elasticity was 
0.19 over this period. Hence, the market probably is more competitive than Cournot, 
or in other words, the (average) mark-up for roasted coffee is not larger than predicted 
with Cournot competition, though it can of course be much smaller.  
 
A more exact estimate of the maximum value of θ  can be obtained by using Equation 
(6). Marginal cost for producing one kilo of roasted coffee is set equal to the price of 
imported green coffee beans, adjusted for weight loss during roasting, and import and 
value added tax. The evolution ofθ  is reported in Figure 7. The overall pattern is an 
increase from about 0.05 before the price shock in the mid-1970s to 0.12 in the mid-
1980s. During the period 1985- 2002, θ  fluctuates around an average of 0.1 with 
maximum and minimum levels of 0.12 and 0.6, respectively. Hence, for this period, θ  
is too low for Cournot competition, which would require it to be in the range of 0.20 
to 0.27.  However, it is clearly larger than zero. We can thus conclude that the market 
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is fairly competitive, since 0.1 is an overestimate of the actual degree of market 
power.    
 
These results also shed light on the conflicting results from global value chain 
analyses, such as Talbot (1997) and Daviron and Ponte (2005), who find large spreads 
between consumer prices and bean import prices, and from econometric analyses, 
which fail to detect substantial deviations from perfect competition (see Gibbon, 
2005).  The spread is large because the low price elasticity, in combination with a 
small amount of market power, generates a large difference between price and 
marginal cost, as implied by Equation (6).    
 
Figure 7 indicates that there was a permanent increase in θ  from the mid-1980s. This 
could be due to the breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement that regulated 
the supply of coffee beans and minimum prices, which shifted market power from 
coffee growers to multinationals (Talbot, 1997; Ponte, 2002). The increase in market 
power is small though, and could be due to rising marginal cost not captured in the 
analysis. Nevertheless, if taken at face value, the change in market power from 0.05 to 
0.1, which appears negligible, raises the spread from 25% to 50% when the price 
elasticity is 0.20.  
 
The final issue is how demand would respond to a decrease in the spread between 
green coffee bean prices and consumer prices. Morisset (1997) simulates a reduction 
in the spread of some primary commodities, including coffee, due to a drop in 
consumer prices in U.S. and some European countries.  He finds a strong impact on 
export revenue in developing countries. However, in our case, the trend in coffee 
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demand makes the impact of decreases in coffee prices quite small. This is illustrated 
by the recent decrease in real coffee prices: they went from 76 Swedish kronor in 
1998 to 51 kronor in 2002, while annual consumption dropped from 9.6 kg per adult 
to 9.4 kg.  
 
To further highlight the role of prices, the response of coffee consumption to a 
reduction in the consumer price to the price of imports of green coffee beans 
(including import and value added tax) from 1990 to 2002 is calculated. The 
assumption is that there is a shift to perfect competition in 1990 and that prices then 
are determined by marginal cost. This implies a price decline of over 50%, where, for 
instance, the consumer price is reduced from 56 to 25 kronor in 1990 and from 51 to 
19 kronor in 2002. This generates an increase in consumption of about 8%, a very 
small increase for a large, and unrealistic, reduction in prices. The reasons for the 
weak response are the downward trend in coffee demand due to differences in 
preferences across age groups and low price elasticity. It is likely that Morisset 
obtained a strong effect on export revenue because he disregarded the dynamics of 
demand. 
8. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to evaluate the role of market power and prices in 
determining the demand for roasted coffee in Sweden. This is of interest because it 
can shed light on the functioning of consumer coffee markets and the determinants of 
the demand for coffee beans supplied by Third-World countries.  
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Demand for roasted coffee was estimated using market data from Sweden for the 
period 1968-2002. In the long run, demand is mainly determined by population 
dynamics in combination with differences in preferences across generations; those 
born before the 1960s consume more coffee than younger generations. This result is 
in accordance with industry wisdom. Consumer prices also influence demand, but 
they only explain deviations from the long-run trend. Moreover, price elasticity is 
low, on average 0.19 in absolute terms. As a result, even large price reductions 
generate small increases in demand for roasted coffee and, consequently, for imports 
of coffee beans.  
 
To illustrate the response of coffee consumption to a consumer price decline, the 
impact of a price reduction to the level of the import price of green beans, including 
import and value added tax, was calculated for the period 1990-2002. Bean imports 
would have been about 8% higher, even though the price declined by over 50%. This 
finding differs from those of Morisset (1997), which indicate a substantial increase in 
export earnings, albeit in a very different model. The reason is probably that 
Morisset’s model does not include the dynamics of coffee demand adequately.  
 
The maximum elasticity adjusted Lerner index was found to only be about 0.10 for 
the period 1985-2002, where zero is perfect competition and one is monopoly or a 
perfect cartel. This points to the presence of some market power, but it is small and 
well below what is predicted by Cournot competition. The analysis does not show 
where this market power comes from, since market data is used and coffee is treated 
as a homogenous good. However, roasters are likely to have some market power 
because of branding and advertising and some roasters might be able to exercise 
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regional market power. Moreover, it is possible that retailers also have some market 
power, although margins for coffee are considered to be low in general. Detailed 
micro data are needed in order to analyse these issues.  Unfortunately, they are not 
available.  
 
Although there is a low degree of market power, a substantial spread between 
consumer and bean prices is generated when it interacts with the low price elasticity. 
This is evident when comparing periods before and after 1985. The measure of market 
power increased from approximately 0.05 to 0.1.  Although this was a small increase 
in absolute terms, it nevertheless led to a substantial rise in the spread between 
consumer and import prices (roughly from 25% to 50%). We cannot say whether this 
change was due to increases in other costs without controlling for all components of 
marginal cost.  Nonetheless, it was in line with Talbot (1997) and others who claim 
that there was an increase in market power following the breakdown of the 
International Coffee Agreement.  
 
The results of this study were obtained from one national coffee market, and they 
might not be relevant for other markets. Nevertheless, most industrialised countries 
have a market structure similar to the Swedish one: some of the largest multinationals 
are present in almost all consumer markets and the concentration of the four largest 
firms is usually very high (see Clarke, et al., 2002; Sutton, 1992). Moreover, price 
elasticity is generally low, and, at least in North European markets, per-capita 
consumption is stagnant or declining (Durevall, 2003).  
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Finally, it is possible that large roasters and traders have market power as buyers in 
the market for green coffee, as argued by Oxfam (2002) and Ponte (2002). We have 
not analyzed this issue.  However, if they influence bean prices, increased competition 
is likely to have a beneficial effect on export revenue of coffee producing countries, 
particularly since consumer price elasticity is low.  
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Table 1 
Determination of lags and diagnostic tests, 1969-2002 
Multivariate tests    
AR 1-2 test F(8,46) = 0.846 [0.567] 
Normality test χ²(4 ) = 7.280 [0.122] 
Hetero test F(18,54) = 0.945 [0.531] 
Hetero-X test F(27,47) = 0.881 [0.631]     
Schwartz Criteria Two lags One lag  
 10.07  9.53  
Tests of model reduction, 
2 to 1 lag: F(4,48) = 0.394 [0.812]   
1 to 0 lag of ΔY: F(2,26) = 0.731 [0.491]   
Note: The estimation period is 1968-2002. The vector autoregression 
includes one lag on Q and P, and Gt, ΔYt, a constant and an impulse 
dummy that takes a value of unity in 1977. 
 
 
Table 2 
 Cointegration analysis, 1968-2002 
 
Eigenvalue of Π-matrix 0.62 0.35 
Null hypothesis r = 0 r = 1
Trace test 48.75 14.79
90% critical value 22.76 10.49
Roots of process 0.60 0.16
Roots without G 1.02 0.61
 
Variable Q P G 
 β’1 1.000 0.028 -13.42 
 β’2 4.80 1.00 -113.06 
α1 -1.47 (0.18) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
 
α2 1.20 (5.39) 
-0.48   
(0.12) 
 
Test of significance a given variable
 
 Q P G 
χ²(3) 31.83** 26.54** 33.23**
Note: Critical values for the trace tests are from Johansen 
(1995). They are based on the asymptotic distributions for 
restricted trend and unrestricted constant. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses, and ‘**’ indicate significance 
at the 1% level. 
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Table 3 
 Restricted cointegrated vectors and adjustment coefficients 
 
Variable  Q  P  G 
 β’1 1.00 0.00 -13.49 
 β’2 0.00 1.00 0.00 
α1 -1.09 
(0.18) 
-0.03 
 (0.007) 
 
α2 -3.19 
(5.56) 
-0.46 
(0.21) 
 
 
Test for restricted cointegrating vectors χ²(1) = 2.30 [0.13] 
 Standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values in brackets. 
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Figure 1: Coffee consumption, kilo per adult _______, and mean and variance 
adjusted real income •−−•−−•. 
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Figure 2: Coffee consumption, kilo per adult ______, and mean and variance 
adjusted price of coffee per kg in constant 1995 Swedish kronor •−−•−−•. 
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Figure 3: Coffee consumption per adult (left scale), ______, and the share of 
adults born before 1960 in total adult population (right scale), •−−•−−•.   
 
 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
 
Figure 4: Price of roasted coffee in constant 1995 Swedish kronor , ______ , and 
coffee consumption net of the effect of G, the share of adults born before 1960 
in total adult population, mean and variance adjusted, •−−•−−•. 
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Figure 5: Recursive estimates of the coefficients with ± 2 standard error (top 
four graphs), one-step residuals with ± 2 estimated standard errors (left in 
third row), one-step (right in third row), break-point (left in bottom row) and 
forecast (right in bottom row). Chow statistics scaled with their 1% critical 
values. The straight line at unity shows the 1% critical level. 
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Figure 6: Absolute values of the price elasticity, 1968-2002. 
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Figure 7: The elasticity adjusted Lerner index, θ, derived from Equation (6?) 
using cost of imports as marginal cost.  
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1 See, for example, Dicum and Luttinger (1999), Fitter and Kaplinsky (2001), Ponte (2002), Oxfam 
(2002), Gooding (2003), Moore, (2003), McCorriston et al. (2004), Daviron and Ponte (2005), Gibbon 
(2005), and Green (2005). 
2 Sutton (1991), Clarke et al. (2002) and Durevall (2003) provide information on market shares in 
various other countries.  
3 See Sutton (1991) on the coffee roasting production process. Inputs, such as labour, energy, 
packaging, transport, physical capital, etc, usually each make up much less than 5% of total variable 
costs, rarely more than 10% in Germany and the US (Koerner 2002).  In Sweden, only wages and 
packaging have ever exceeded 5% of variable costs (Statistics Sweden, various issues). 
4 Corts (1999) examines other difficulties of estimating structural oligopoly models.     
5 According to C. Åkerstedt (the Swedish National Coffee Association), there are no contracts that 
prevent roasters from adjusting prices.  
6 See Bresnahan (1989) for a description of different approaches of measuring market power.  
7 In Cournot equilibrium 1t itQ Q∂ ∂ = 2( / ) ( / ) ,i ii i iQ Q Q Qθ θ= =∑ ∑ so which is the Herfindahl 
Index. 
8 The functional form used in studies of coffee demand varies, but linear and log-linear models are the 
most common ones, although Bettendorf and Verboven (2000) also estimate a non-linear model and 
Olekalns and Bardsley (1996) estimate a model with forward looking expectations. All four 
specifications were tried; the linear and log-linear versions did equally well and basically provide the 
same information, while there was little empirical support for the other two. This is probably due to the 
limited number of observations. 
9 Estimation of coffee demand with tea prices instead of CPI produced t-values below 2 in absolute 
value. In fact, tea prices fluctuate too little over time to explain changes in coffee demand. Bettendorf 
and Verboven (2000) and Feuerstein (2002) also fail to find that the tea prices influence coffee demand 
in the Netherlands and Germany, respectively. 
10 Information provided by the Swedish National Coffee Association (2005b) 
11 See Juselius (2001) for a very clear and instructive illustration of the use of the Johansen approach 
with annual data. 
12 The following variables are used in the empirical analysis: Consumer price per kilo roasted coffee, 
based on 500-gram packets, from Statistics Sweden; consumer price index from IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics,; consumption of roasted coffee, from the Swedish Board of Agriculture; income, 
measured as household expenditures, from International Financial Statistics; population, from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s International Data Base (IDB); import price of green coffee beans, calculated from 
data on quantity and value of imports from Statistics Sweden; and VAT, from European Commission, 
(2002b). 
13 Since the sample is small, the cointegration analysis was also carried out with partial models. 
However, the results do not depend on the exact specification of the model: repeating the analysis with 
only Q and G in one model, and Q and P in another, gives the same results, as does excluding the 
dummy and the income variable. However, the normality test is significant when the dummy is not 
included. 
14 The unrestricted cointegrating vectors are not reported, but Figure 4 shows the restricted ones. 
15 The increase in consumption in 1976 is likely to be due to hoarding related to the frost in Brazil.  
16 See Hendry and Doornik (2001) on recursive estimation. 
17 The Lerner index for Cournot competition is ,H ε where H is the Herfindahl index and ε  is the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of demand (see Martin, 2002, p. 338). 
